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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Public Service Commission failed to properly 
consider each of the factors mandated by the Legislature in 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-3(2), in reaching its decision to 
detariff rate levels for mobile telephone service. 
II. Whether the Public Service Commission erred by basing find-
ings of fact solely on the testimony of Mr. James H. Murphy 
which lacked any proper foundation and included speculation 
and hearsay. 
III. Whether findings of fact Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 
15 and 16 are unsupported by the record and are erroneous as 
a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is taken from a decision of the Utah Public 
Service Commission issued on April 17, 1987 granting in part, and 
denying in part, a petition by Mountain Bell seeking partial 
deregulation of mobile and rural radio services under Utah Code 
Ann. S 54-8b-l et seq. The Commission by its Report and Order 
detariffed mobile radio service and exempted the suppliers of 
such services from the requirement of seeking prior approval for 
rate changes. It denied, however, similar requests regarding 
rural radio service. Petitioner herein filed a Petition for 
Review and Rehearing which was deemed denied due to Commission 
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inaction. The matter is now before the Court pursuant to 
Industrial's Petition for Review filed on June 23, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 9f 1985, The Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell) filed a petition with the Utah 
Public Service Commission (the "Commission") seeking an order 
exempting it completely from regulation with regard to mobile 
radio service and rural radio service. The petition was filed 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §S 54-8b-l £t sea, and was assigned 
Case No. 85-049-09. In support of its petition, Mountain Bell 
prefiled the direct testimony and exhibits of James H. Murphy at 
the time the petition was filed. 
On August 19, 1985, NewVector Communications, Inc. 
("NewVector") filed a Motion to Intervene.2 On August 20, 1985, 
David R. Williams d/b/a Industrial Communications ("Industrial") 
filed a Notice of Intervention and Protest. On August 23, 1985, 
1 In its Petition to the Commission, Mountain Bell defines 
mobile radio service as " . . . a communication service furnished 
through a mobile telephone service base station between a wire 
line telephone and a mobile telephone unit or between two mobile 
units." Rural radio service is defined as " . . . a communica-
tion service furnished through a mobile telephone base station or 
central office station between a rural customer station and a 
wire line telephone, between a rural customer station and a 
mobile unit, or between two rural customer stations." (R. at 
465-66). 
2 NewVector later changed its name to U.S. West NewVector Group, 
Inc. 
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Mobile Telephone, Inc. ("Mobile") filed a Notice of Intervention 
3 
and Protest. 
On January 9, 1986, Mountain Bell and the Utah Division 
of Public Utilities (the "Division") filed a joint motion for a 
continuance on the ground that Mountain Bell had not completed 
development and implementation of an accounting system to sepa-
rate regulated services from unregulated services. (R. at 673.) 
The hearing date which had previously been set for March 4, 1986 
was vacated and a further Prehearing Conference was set for 
August 5, 1986. (R. at 685.) 
At the Prehearing Conference on August 5, 1986, Moun-
tain Bell indicated that, in light of the fact that its account-
ing system still had not been fully implemented, it was changing 
its request for relief in this matter from full exemption from 
all regulation by the Commission to a request that the Commission 
detariff the rate levels for fixed rural and mobile radio serv-
ices. (R. at 692-93.) The Commission concluded that Mountain 
Bell did not need to file a new petition since the detariffing of 
rate levels was contemplated by the original petition. (R. at 
693.) A Commission hearing was scheduled, for November, 1986. 
In a Prehearing Conference in September, 1985, the Com-
mission concluded that Mountain Bell's petition should be treated 
as a generic proceeding to consider the effects of possible 
3 Mobile was later acquired by Daniels & Associates. 
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deregulation on other related companies. The Commission there-
fore assigned the petition a generic docket number, Case No. 
85-999-19, and ordered that all other providers of rural and 
mobile radio services in Utah be notified of the proceeding. (R. 
at 487.) 
Hearings in the consolidated proceedings were held by 
the Commission on November 13 and 14, 1986 and on January 20, 
1987. Mountain Bell presented only one direct witness in support 
of its petition, Mr. James H. Murphy. Over repeated objections 
and motions to strike made by Industrial's counsel, the Commis-
sion entertained the testimony and exhibits of Mr. Murphy. (R. 
at 21, 58, 61-3, 94, 117.) In commenting on the "hearsay" aspect 
of Mr. Murphy's testimony, Commissioner Cameron stated: "Hearsay 
evidence is admissible in Utah administrative hearings. It can-
not be relied on solely for findings of fact or conclusion by the 
Commission." (R. at 29-30.) Division witnesses Mr. Robert 
Capshaw and Dr. George R. Compton admitted before the Commission 
that their testimony was based in part on the testimony of Mr. 
Murphy. (R. at 160, 187-88.) Mr. Murphy admitted that his tes-
timony and exhibits contained facts obtained from a third party 
source, about which he had no personal knowledge. (R. at 51-53.) 
Final arguments were heard by the Commission on January 20, 1987. 
On April 17, 1987, the Commission issued its Report and 
Order in consolidated cases 87-049-09 and 85-999-19. The Order 
of the Commission stated: 
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1. Effective immediately, regulated suppli-
ers of mobile telephone service in the fol-
lowing cities and surrounding areas, may 
remove rate levels from their tariffs: 
Moab Monticello 
Ogden Salt Lake City 
Provo Price 
Vernal 
Such suppliers need not seek prior approval 
of changes in rates for mobile telephone 
service. 
2. Rate levels for rural radio service 
shall continue to be tariffed and subject to 
all regulatory requirements of Title 54. 
(R. at 582-83.) (A copy of the Report and Order is attached 
hereto as Appendix "A".) Industrial filed its Petition for 
Review and Rehearing with the Commission on May 5, 1987. (R. at 
537.) (A copy of the Petition for Review and Rehearing is 
attached hereto as Appendix "B".) The Commission took no action 
concerning the Petition for Review and Rehearing during the time 
period specified in Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15, and so it is deemed 
denied. Industrial filed its Petition for Review with this Court 
on June 23, 1987. (R. at 561.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Commission concluded in its Report and Order dated 
April 17, 1987, that it was not required to consider each of the 
factors (a) through (k) as set forth by the Legislature in Utah 
Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2). In fact, during the hearings before the 
Commission, no competent evidence whatsoever was introduced by 
Mountain Bell or any other party with regard to some of the 
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factors enumerated by the Legislature in S 54-8b-3(2). The Find-
ings of Fact upon which the Commission based its decision to 
detariff rate levels of mobile telephone service providers in the 
seven cities listed in the Commission's Order were based solely 
upon hearsay evidence and upon unsubstantiated conclusions drawn 
by witnesses and by the Commission itself. As such the 
Commission's Findings of Fact were inadequate as a matter of law, 
and the Commission's Order is invalid under the requirements of 
the statute. 
In the hearings held by the Commission on this matter 
on November 13 and 14, 1986 and on January 20, 1987, the Commis-
sion allowed Mountain Bell to present prefiled and direct testi-
mony of Mr. James H. Murphy. Mr. Murphy's testimony was admit-
tedly based upon facts of which he had no personal knowledge and 
as to which he was incompetent to testify. Over petitioner's 
repeated objections and motions to strike, the Commission heard 
and considered Mr. Murphy's testimony despite its lack of founda-
tion and despite the fact that it was clearly hearsay. The Com-
mission then relied solely upon Mr. Murphy's hearsay testimony in 
making Findings of Fact upon which it based its decision to 
detariff mobile radio service rate levels. 
In addition, the testimony presented by Division wit-
nesses, Robert Capshaw and George R. Compton, contained hearsay, 
was without foundation, and was based at least in part upon the 
incompetent hearsay testimony of Mr. Murphy. As a result, the 
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Commission's ultimate Findings of Fact and decision to allow 
mobile telephone service providers to remove rate levels from 
their tariffs were based solely upon incompetent, hearsay testi-
mony and are invalid as a matter of law. 
Finally, several of the Commission's Finding of Facts 
were either based on incompetent evidence or are wholly devoid of 
any support in the record. Because these facts are unsupported 
by the record, they are erroneous as a matter of law. Thus the 
Commission's Report and Order based upon these unsupported find-
ings and conclusions is invalid. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND ORDER IS INVALID 
BECAUSE THE COMMISSION FAILED TO FOLLOW THE 
PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR 
PARTIALLY OR WHOLLY EXEMPTING PUBLIC TELECOM-
MUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS FROM REGULATION. 
A. The Commission Failed to Consider and Make Find-
ings of Fact Regarding Relevant Factors Mandated by the Legisla-
ture for Consideration in S 54-8b-3(2). 
In 1985 the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-8b-3, which gives the Commission jurisdiction and power to 
partially or wholly exempt any telecommunications corporation or 
public telecommunication services from any requirement of Title 
54. Section 54-8b-3 states in relevant part: 
(1) The commission is vested with power and 
jurisdiction to partially or wholly exempt 
from any requirement of this title any 
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telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service in this state. 
(2) The commission, on its own initiative or 
in response to an application by a telecommu-
nications corporation or a user of a public 
telecommunications service, mayf after public 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, make 
findings and issue an order specifying its 
requirements, terms, and conditions exempting 
any telecommunications corporation or any 
public telecommunications service from any 
requirement of this title either for a spe-
cific geographic area or in the entire state 
if the commission finds that the telecommuni-
cations corporation or service is subject to 
effective competition, that customers of the 
telecommunications corporation or service 
have reasonably available alternatives, and 
that the telecommunications corporation or 
service does not serve a captive customer 
base, and if such exemption is in the public 
interest of the citizens of the state. In 
determining whether to exempt any telecommu-
nications corporation or public telecommuni-
cations service from any requirement of this 
title, the commission shall consider all rel-
evant factors including, but not limited to; 
(a) the number of other providers offering 
similar services; (b) the intrastate market 
power and market share within the state of 
Utah of the telecommunications corporation 
requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate 
market power and market share of other pro-
viders; (d) the existence of other providers 
to make functionally equivalent services 
readily available at competitive rates, 
terms, and conditions; (e) the effect of 
exemption on the regulated revenue require-
ments of the telecommunications corporation 
requesting an exemption; (f) the ease of 
entry of other providers into the market-
place; (g) the overall impact of exemption on 
the public interest; (h) the integrity of all 
service providers in the proposed market; 
(i) the cost of providing such service; 
(j) the economic impact on existing telecom-
munications corporations; and (k) whether 
competition will promote the provision of 
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adequate services at just and reasonable 
rates, 
Utah Code Ann. S 54-8b-3 (1985) (emphasis added). 
The language of Section 54-8b-3 makes it clear that the 
Legislature, in enacting the statute, did not intend to vest the 
Commission with unrestricted authority to partially or wholly 
exempt public telecommunication services from the requirements of 
Title 54. Rather, its intent was to establish a procedure which, 
when correctly followed, would allow the Commission to grant 
exemptions under certain circumstances. 
In the hearings before the Commission no competent 
evidence was introduced either by Mountain Bell or by the Divi-
sion regarding a number of the factors that "shall" be considered 
under Subsection (2)(a) through (k) of S 54-8b-3. As a result 
the Commission has ignored the procedure established by the 
Legislature and its Report and Order issued April 17, 1987 is 
invalid. 
For example, "relevant factor" (i), "the cost of 
providing such service," is critical in this case because Moun-
tain Bell's Petition seeks removal of rate levels from the 
pricing of its services. However, despite the fact that Mountain 
Bell's witness had available cost studies which he could have 
presented to the Commission, the Commission refused to require 
production of such evidence, finding instead that this particular 
factor was not relevant in this case. The Commission concluded, 
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"while costs may be a relevant factor in our ongoing oversight 
role, we do not believe it is necessary or relevant that we 
review specific cost data to determine whether exemption should 
be allowed. . . ." (R. at 531.) By substituting its wisdom for 
that of the Legislature in this manner, the Commission was 
clearly acting beyond the scope of its authority and in direct 
contravention of statutory requirements. 
B. The Commission Improperly Interpreted the Language 
of S 54-8b-3(2). 
In its Report and Order in this case, the Commission 
correctly pointed out that Section 54-8b-3(2): 
. . .sets forth four findings that the Com-
mission must make to support an exemption 
from regulation for a service: 
1. The service is subject to 
effective competition; 
2. Customers of the service have 
reasonably available alternatives; 
3. The service does not serve a 
captive customer base; and 
4. Exemption is in the public 
interest. 
(R. at 569.) However, the Report goes on to state: 
These are the only four issues upon which the 
Commission must make explicit findings. . . . 
By expressly requiring findings as to the 
four, but merely indicating that the others 
shall be considered, the Legislature is indi-
cating its intent that the latter are to 
serve as a general guide of relevant ques-
tions to examine but is not necessarily indi-
cating that all the criteria are necessarily 
relevant in a given case. Indeed, the 
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statute indicates that other criteria in a 
given case may be relevant. One thing is 
completely clear: the Legislature is not 
requiring separate findings as to each of the 
factors. 
(R. at 571.) 
The position taken by the Commission is in direct oppo-
sition to the plain language of the statute. The statute reads, 
"In determining whether to exempt any telecommunications corpora-
tion or public telecommunication service from any requirement of 
this title, the Commission shall consider all relevant factors 
including but not limited to" those factors set forth in subpara-
graphs (a)-(k). Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-3(2) (emphasis added). 
Although the Commission is not required to make specific findings 
of fact as to "all relevant factors" including those designated 
in subparagraphs (a)-(k), it "shall" consider them. Id. As a 
matter of law, it cannot and did not consider them when no evi-
dence was submitted with respect to those matters. As noted 
above, Mountain Bell admitted that it had in its possession its 
"cost of providing such service" — yet it failed to produce the 
same. (R. at 97-100.) Even worse, the Mountain Bell witness 
refused to disclose this information on cross-examination and the 
Commission refused, on appropriate request, to require him to 
answer questions eliciting those very facts. (R. at 97-100.) 
Rather than follow the procedure established by the 
Legislature in S54-8b-3, the Commission concluded that " . . . 
examination of the additional factors demonstrates that it would 
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be virtually impossible to reduce some of them to factual testi-
mony or to precise factual conclusions. . . • Thus, while the 
Commission needs to bear these factors in mind, there is no legal 
requirement to make explicit factual findings as to each." (R. 
at 572.) This blanket dismissal of the Legislative requirement 
that the Commission consider all of the relevant factors listed 
in §54-8b-3(2)(a)-(k) directly contradicts the plain language of 
the statute, and by so acting, the Commission has exceeded its 
authority and its Order in this case is invalid. 
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public 
Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), this Court, in 
striking down a "senior citizen rate" approved by the Commission 
for establishing electric utility fees, stated the following: 
[l]f the Commission has not acted within the 
powers delegated to it by the Legislature, or 
there is no legal basis in fact for the find-
ings of the Commission, or the findings do 
not rationally support proper legal conclu-
sions, an order is contrary to law and must 
be set aside. Commission expertise alone is 
not an adequate basis upon which ultimate 
findings as to reasonableness of rates and 
classifications of customers may be based. 
It is, therefore, the responsibility of 
this Court to determine whether the Commis-
sion acted outside its jurisdiction, in 
excess of its lawful powers, or in a manner 
which is arbitrary and capricious and there-
fore without legal justification. (Citations 
omitted.) 
Id. at 1051. 
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In the case at bar, the Commission has adopted an 
interpretation of S 54-8b-3 which is contrary to the plain lan-
guage of that statute. The Commission has therefore acted "in 
excess of its lawful powers, . . . in a manner which is arbitrary 
and capricious and therefore without legal justification." Id. 
In West Jordan v. Department of Employment Sec, 656 
P.2d 411 (Utah 1982), a case involving an appeal taken to the 
State Industrial Commission regarding the right of a terminated 
employee to receive unemployment compensation benefits, this 
Court held that "agency decisions are still subject to judicial 
review and will be reversed when they are inconsistent with the 
governing legislation or the decisions of this Court." Id. at 
412. Under the facts of the present case, the Commission has 
clearly acted in a manner inconsistent with the language of S 54-
8b-3, and its Order should be invalidated. 
C. Mountain Bell Failed to Offer, and the Commission 
Failed to Require Information Regarding the Factors Listed in 
$ 54-8b-3(2)(a) through (k) Even When Such Information Was Admit-
tedly In Mountain Bell's Possession. 
On cross-examination before the Commission, Mountain 
Bell's witness, Mr. Murphy, admitted that he was aware of the 
revenue/cost relationship of Mountain Bell's radio services but 
declined to produce that information because it was "proprie-
tary." (R. at 97-100.) Despite the Legislature's instruction in 
S54-8b-3(2) (i) that the Commission is to consider "the cost of 
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providing such service," the Commission failed to require, and 
Mountain Bell refused to present testimony regarding Mountain 
Bell's costs. (R. at 100-102.) This action by the Commission 
exemplifies its unwillingness to follow the procedure of 
§54-8b-3. By failing to require evidence on this and other "rel-
evant factors," the Commission ignored the Legislature's 
requirements. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND ORDER WAS BASED 
SOLELY UPON HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND INCOMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
A. The Testimony and Exhibits Offered in Support of 
Mountain Bell's Petition by Mr. Murphy Were Based Upon Hearsay 
and Facts of Which He Had No Personal Knowledge. 
In Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 
P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959), this Court held that hearsay testi-
mony is admissible in proceedings before the Public Service Com-
mission. However, in so holding this Court also stated that "a 
finding of fact cannot be based solely on hearsay evidence, but 
it must be 'supported by a residuum of legal evidence competent 
in a court of law.'" Id. See also, Sandy State Bank v. 
Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481, 486 (Utah 1981) (in a hearing before a 
Utah Bank Commissioner hearsay evidence was admissible, however, 
finding of fact could not be based solely upon hearsay evidence 
unless the finding was supported "by a residuum of legal evidence 
competent in a court of law."); Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control 
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Commission, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984) ("hearsay evidence is 
admissible in proceedings before administrative agencies. How-
ever, findings of fact cannot be based exclusively on hearsay 
evidence. They must be supported by a residuum of legal evidence 
competent in a court of law."). 
In the hearings held before the Commission, evidence 
was introduced by Mr. Murphy, in the form of a chart which pur-
portedly gives a percentage of the market share held by various 
carriers as a function of the number of radio channels held by 
those companies. (R. at 757.) Mr. Murphy was called not as an 
expert, but as a fact witness. As such he was competent to tes-
tify only as to facts of which he had personal knowledge. Utah 
R. Evid. 602. Mr. Murphy admitted before the Commission that he 
had no personal knowledge of the percentages and figures con-
tained in the exhibit. (R. at 52.) In addition, Mr. Murphy tes-
tified that he did not have any personal knowledge as to which, 
if any, of the channels listed in the exhibit were being utilized 
by the corresponding service providers. (R. at 52, 53.) 
Because Mr. Murphy's oral and documentary testimony as 
to market share and number of channels was based upon facts of 
which he had no personal knowledge, his testimony was presented 
to the Commission without adequate foundation. In addition, Mr. 
Murphy admitted that his information was obtained from a third 
party source. (R. at 51-52.) As such, his testimony was hearsay 
and was inadmissible. It was error for the Commission to base 
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its findings of fact regarding adequate competition solely upon 
Mr. Murphy's testimony, 
B. No Competent Evidence was Presented to the Commis-
sion Upon Which it Could Base its Report and Order or Findings of 
Fact. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-3(2) requires, among other 
things, that the Commission, in wholly or partially exempting 
telecommunications service from the requirements of Title 54, 
make findings of fact "that the telecommunications corporation or 
service is subject to a effective competition, [and] that custom-
ers of the telecommunications corporation or service have reason-
ably available alternatives." I_d. In the case at bar, the only 
witness before the Commission for Mountain Bell to testify 
regarding competition, market share and available alternatives 
was Mr. Murphy. Because Mr. Murphy's testimony regarding these 
items was admittedly based upon facts as to which he had no per-
sonal knowledge, the Commission had no "legally competent evi-
dence" before it upon which it could base its factual findings. 
339 P.2d at 1014. As a result, the Commission's Findings of Fact 
were based solely on hearsay evidence, unsupported by a "residuum 
of legal evidence competent in a court of law." Id. 
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C« The Testimony of Division Witnesses Robert Capshaw 
and George R. Compton was Based Upon the Hearsay Testimony of Mr. 
James H. Murphy. 
During cross-examination before the Commission, Divi-
sion witness Dr. George R. Compton admitted that in formulating 
his opinion as to facts presented in the proceeding he had relied 
upon documents provided by Mr. Murphy. As stated above, Mr. 
Murphy's testimony, and in particular his documentary evidence 
regarding market shares was hearsay evidence and cannot be the 
sole basis for findings by the Commission. (R. at 204.) In 
addition, Division witness Mr. Robert Capshaw admitted on 
cross-examination that in preparing his testimony he had before 
him the testimony of Mountain Bell, which consisted of the docu-
mentary evidence of Mr. Murphy and his prefiled testimony. (R. at 
160.) 
It is clear from the above admissions that the testi-
mony of both Dr. Compton and Mr. Capshaw before the Commission 
was based upon the hearsay testimony of Mr. Murphy. Therefore, 
it cannot be said that the Commission had before it legally com-
petent evidence aside from the hearsay testimony of Mr. Murphy 
upon which it could base its Findings of Fact regarding effective 
competition and availability of other carriers. As a result, 
under the standard enunciated by this Court, the Commission's 
Findings of Fact were not based upon a residuum of competent evi-
dence and are invalid. 
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III. THE COMMISSIONS FINDING OF FACT, NO. 2, 3, 5, 
6, 1, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 AND 16 ARE NOT FACTU-
ALLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND ARE ERRO-
NEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In Mountain States Legal Foundation, supra, this Court 
stated: 
For this Court to sustain an order, the 
findings must be sufficiently detailed to 
demonstrate that the Commission has properly 
arrived at the ultimate factual findings and 
has properly applied the governing rules of 
law to those findings. Ultimate findings as 
to reasonableness and discrimination must be 
sustained if there are adequate subordinate 
findings to support them, and there is sub-
stantial evidence to support the findings. 
636 P.2d at 1052. 
In the present case, the Commission did not "properly 
arrive at [its] ultimate factual findings . . . " and its findings 
are not supported by "adequate subordinate findings. . . . " Id. 
Thus, the Commission's Report and Order are invalid as a matter 
of law. 
In its Report and Order, Commission Finding of Fact No. 
2 states that "several types of entities offer functionally 
equivalent types of mobile radio service." (R. at 573) (emphasis 
added). A central underpinning finding of this paragraph is that 
"specialized mobile radio (SMR) providers" offer a "functionally 
equivalent" service. Section 54-8b-3(2)(d) defines a "function-
ally equivalent" service to include those "available at competi-
tive rates, terms, and conditions." The only evidence upon which 
this Finding of Fact could be premised is the incompetent 
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testimony of Mr. Murphy. Mr. Murphy admitted that he had no 
knowledge of information relating to either the identity of or 
the services offered by any SMR offering a service in the State 
of Utah. The findings as to each of the designated areas that 
SMR's offer a "functionally equivalent" service are erroneous on 
their face. The record is absolutely barren of any evidence upon 
which the necessary further examination could be made to ascer-
tain whether or not such services were "readily available at com-
petitive rates, terms and conditions." id. Indeed, there is no 
evidence on this record relating to their rates and the 
uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that their terms and condi-
tions of service are completely different. In fact, SMR's are 
not even regulated by the Commission. 
Similarly, the statement in Finding of Fact No. 3, that 
SMR providers in Salt Lake City offer "functionally equivalent" 
mobile services is erroneous as a matter of law. The additional 
critical finding made here by the Commission that "NewVector" and 
"Salt Lake City Cellular" also offer a "functionally equivalent" 
service is without support in the record. (R. at 525.) 
Similarly, Finding of Fact No. 5 (R. at 526) that "in 
the Ogden area, functionally equivalent mobile radio services 
offered to the public by Mountain Bell, Daniels, Industrial, 
NewVector, Salt Lake City Cellular and at least one SMR" is not 
supported by the record. 
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Each of the Findings of Fact contained in paragraph 6 
(R. at 526) is similarly erroneous, not supported by evidence, 
and contrary to the uncontroverted evidence. As a matter of 
factf Mountain Bell has 100% of the Ogden market. It has a cap-
tive customer base. Customers have no competitive alternative 
available to them whatsoever. Although Industrial has authority 
from this Commission to serve this area, it cannot do so competi-
tively because customers in Ogden desiring to call mobile units 
in Ogden have to pay a long-distance charge when dealing with 
Industrial which is not true with Mountain Bell. This explains 
why Mountain Bell has 100% of the market. No other service is 
competitive at all. (R. at 241.) 
Finding of Fact No. 7 (R. at 641-42) is similarly erro-
neous. In the Provo area, Mountain Bell has 100% of the market 
because none of the regulated characters can offer a complete 
service without imposing a long-distance charge. Thus, Mountain 
Bell services a captive customer base with no reasonable alterna-
tive service available in the Provo area. (R. at 235, 238.) 
The Findings of Fact contained in paragraph 9 (R. at 
642) are erroneous in that they find that SMR's in the Vernal 
area offer a "functionally equivalent" service and that mobile 
radio services are subject to effective competition in that area. 
(R. at 642.) Industrial is the only arguable competitor of Moun-
tain Bell in the Vernal area. However, it is uncontroverted that 
Mountain Bell has a distinct and unfair competitive advantage in 
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Vernal because all of its services are automated and the Indus-
trial competitive service is manual. Industrial could convert 
its service to a competitive automated service, but only with the 
cooperation of Mountain Bell, which to date has been refused. 
(R. at 291-93.) 
Similarly, the Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 
10 (R. at 576-77) are wholly unsupported by evidence and contrary 
to the uncontroverted evidence with respect to services available 
in the Vernal area. The same is true of the Findings of Fact 
contained in paragraph 14 (R. at 577-78) regarding the Moab and 
Montecello areas. 
Findings of Fact No. 15 (R. at 578) contain numerous 
erroneous findings which duplicate those already addressed above. 
By way of illustration, but not of exclusion, we invite the 
attention of the Court to specific findings set forth in para-
graph 15, not heretofore addressed, which are wholly erroneous on 
this record as a matter of law: 
(a) The statement that "there is no evidence that 
Mountain Bell has the kind of market power that would allow it to 
dictate whatever price it chooses" (R. at 578) is wholly erro-
neous. This Finding of Fact is of specific importance because 
the second full paragraph of subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann. 
S 54-8b-3 mandates the consideration of these very factors. 
Division witness, Mr. Capshaw conceded on cross-examination that 
Mountain Bell and Cellular, (a sister company) could have the 
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staying power to set rates where they could get rid of both 
Mobile and Industrial and have the entire market to themselves. 
(R. at 148.) 
(b) The statements contained in paragraph 15 (R. at 
578-79) to the effect that no one entity dominates market share 
or has market power demonstrated by the number of customers 
served are erroneous. These statements generalize Mobile radio 
service throughout the state of Utah. This simply cannot be done 
because of the local nature of the markets. (R. at 249.) These 
statements are not supported by any evidence whatsoever with 
respect to many of the service areas in the State of Utah where 
only a single provider of service is available. 
In Finding of Fact No. 15(e) the Commission states that 
there is no prohibitive financial burden to entry into the mar-
ket. (R. at 579.) This statement is unsupported by evidence in 
the record and is contrary to other uncontroverted evidence con-
tained in the record. For example, Mr. Capshaw testified that it 
would cost tens of thousands of dollars to enter the market in 
the local rural areas and that, in his opinion, there will never 
be competition in small towns because of the small volume of cus-
tomers and the difficulty with terrain. (R. at 142, 152.) Dr. 
Compton testified that it would cost hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to enter the marketplace in Salt Lake City. (R. at 222.) 
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Finally, Finding of Fact No. 16 (R. at 581) is in fact 
a conclusion of law. As such, it is erroneous as a matter of 
law. 
In summary, each of the Findings of Fact listed above 
fails to meet the standard enunciated by this court in Mountain 
States Legal Foundation and should be vacated by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Commission's 
Report and Order issued in consolidated case nos. 85-049-09 and 
85-999-19 should be vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this $6 ""day of September, 
1987. 
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Petition ) 
Of THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE) 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY for Exemp-) 
tion from Regulation of Mobile ) 
Radio Service and Rural Radio ) 
Service. ) 
CASE NOS. 85-049-09 
85-999-19 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Appearances: 
Ted D. Smith 
Keith E. Taylor 
Jon C. Heaton 
Gregory B. Monson 
Brian W. Burnett, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
By the Commission: 
ISSUED: April 17f 1987 
For The Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph 
Company 
m
 David Williams, dba 
Industrial Communications 
" Daniels and Associates 
" U S West NewVector Group, 
Inc. 
" Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, 
State of Utah 
BACKGROUND 
This matter was initiated on August 9, 1985 by a 
Petition filed by The Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Company (Mountain Bell) seeking an order exempting it from 
regulation with regard to Mobile Radio Service and Rural Radio 
Service. The Petition was filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
54-8b-l et sec. The docket was assigned Case No* 85-049-09. 
Mountain Bell prefiled the direct testimony and exhibits of James 
CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19 
- 2 -
H. Murphy at the time the Petition was filed* On August 19, 
1985, NewVector Communications, Inc. filed a Motion to Intervene. 
NewVector later changed its name to D S West NewVector Group, 
Inc. (NewVector). On August 20, 1985, David R. Williams dba 
Industrial Communications (Industrial) filed a Notice of Inter-
vention and Protest. On August 23, 1985 Mobile Telephone, Inc. 
(Mobile) filed a Notice of Intervention and Protest. Mobile was 
later acquired by Daniels and Associates (Daniels) . In a Pre-
hearing Conference in September, 1985, the Commission concluded 
that this matter should be treated as a generic proceeding so 
that the deregulation of radio services of other companies in 
Utah could be considered. Therefore, it was assigned Case No. 
85-999-19, a generic docket number. Hearing dates were estab-
lished for March A, 1986, and the Division was ordered to notify 
all other providers of rural and mobile radio services in the 
State of Utah of the proceeding. 
On January 9, 1986, Mountain Bell and the Division 
filed a joint motion for a continuance on the ground that Moun-
tain Bell had not completed development and implementation of an 
accounting system to separate regulated from unregulated ser-
vices. The hearing date was vacated and a further Prehearing 
Conference was set for August 5, 1986. 
At the Prehearing Conference on August 5, 1986, Moun-
tain Bell indicated that, in light of the fact that its account-
ing system still had not been fully implemented, it was changing 
its request for relief in this matter from full exemption from 
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all regulation by the Commission to a request that the Commission 
merely detariff the rate levels for fixed rural and mobile radio 
services. The Commission concluded that Mountain Bell did not 
need to file a new petition since the detariffing of rate levels 
was contemplated by the original petition. A hearing was 
scheduled for November, 1986. 
Hearings were held on November 13 and 14, 1986 and on 
January 20, 1987. Mountain Bell presented the direct testimony 
of Mr. James H. Murphy. The Division presented the direct, 
testimony of Mr. Robert Capshaw and Dr. George Compton. Indus-
trial presented the testimony of Mr. David Williams. Daniels 
presented evidence by way of proffer which was received without 
objection. Later in the proceeding, Mountain Bell presented 
rebuttal testimony by Mr. Larry Fuller and Mr. Murphy. The 
Division presented additional testimony of Mr. Capshaw and 
Industrial presented rebuttal testimony of Mr. Williams. Final 
argument was presented to the Commission on January 20, 1986. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This case presents the first opportunity for the 
Commission comprehensively to construe and apply the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-8b-l et. seq., the statute enacted by the 
Utah Legislature in 1985, which authorizes us to exempt certain 
telecommunication services or companies from regulation. 
The issue before us in this proceeding is whether the 
record supports the detariffing of rate levels for mobile and 
rural radio services. It is our conclusion that the facts before 
CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19 
- 4 -
us support the detariffing of rates for mobile service in the 
following cities and their surrounding areas: Moab, Monticello, 
Ogden, Salt Lake City, Provo, Price and Vernal. The record does 
not support the detariffing of rates for rural radio services at 
this time. 
Section 54-8b-3 of the statutes states: 
(1) The commission is vested with power 
and jurisdiction to partially or wholly 
exempt from any requirement of this title any 
telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service in this state* 
(2) The commission, on its own initia-
tive or in response to an application by a 
telecommunications corporation or a user of a 
public telecommunications service, may, after 
public notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing, make findings and issue an order 
specifying its requirements, terms, and 
conditions exempting any telecommunications 
corporation or any public telecommunications 
service from any requirement of this title 
either for a specific geographic area or in 
the entire state if the Commission finds that 
the telecommunications corporation or service 
is subject to effective competition, that 
customers of the telecommunications corpo-
ration or service have reasonably available 
alternatives, and that the telecommunications 
corporation or service does not serve a 
captive customer base, and if such exemption 
is in the public interest of the citizens of 
the state. 
In determining whether to exempt any tele-
communications corporation or public tele-
communications service from any requirement 
of this title, the commission shall consider 
all relevant factors including, but not 
limited to: (a) the number of other provid-
ers offering similar services; (b) the 
intrastate market power and market share 
within the state of Utah of the telecommu-
nications corporation requesting an ex-
emption; (c) the intrastate market power and 
market share of ether providers; (d) the 
existence of other providers to make 
00051* 
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functionally equivalent services readily 
available at competitive rates, terms, and 
conditions; (e) the effect of exemption on 
the regulated revenue requirements of the 
telecommunications corporation requesting an 
exemption; (f) the ease of entry of other 
providers into the marketplace; (g) the 
overall impact of exemption on the public 
interest; (h) the integrity of all service 
providers in the proposed market; (i) the 
cost of providing such service; (j) the 
economic impact on existing telecommunica-
tions corporation; and (k) whether competi-
tion will promote the provision of adequate 
services at just and reasonable rates. 
Subsection (1) establishes the authority of the Commission to 
exempt wholly or in part any requirement of Title 54. Such 
exemption can range from total exemption of every requirement of 
Title 54 (in effect, total deregulation of a Company or service) 
to exempting specific requirements of the law, in which case the 
utility or service will remain subject to all other requirements 
of the law. In this case, we are presented with a petition to 
exempt from regulation the requirement to file and gain prior 
approval for price levels for mobile and rural radio services. 
Even if the Petition is granted, the services will remain subject 
to regulation as to quality, safety, facilities, and other 
non-price conditions of service; in the case of telephone corpo-
rations (like Mountain Bell) that provide other regulated ser-
vices, rate base, expenses and revenues of mobile telephone 
service will continue to be included in ratemaking. 
The telecommunications industry is changing rapidly and 
dramatically through technological change as well as through 
judicial, administrative, and statutory activity on born a state 
nnntr-f n 
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and federal level. That the Legislature intended the statue to 
be a flexible tool is evidenced by Section 54-8b-7: 
The commission shall retain continuous 
jurisdiction ever every telecommunications 
corporation or public telecommunications 
service exempted under this chapter and may 
exercise any statutory grant of power per-
taining thereto, including the power to 
revoke or modify any order approving an 
exemption from regulation. The commission, 
may, after notice and hearing, revoke or 
modify an order approving exemption, if after 
considering the factors in Subsection' 
54-8b-3(2), the commission finds such modi-
fication or revocation to be in the public 
interest. 
(Emphasis added). Under this section, no exemption order is 
final in the sense that the Commission is precluded from revoking 
it. The Commission has the authority to continue to monitor 
developments in a particular market and, if necessary, can 
re-regulate a service. This, as well as the fact that the 
Commission can allow exemption subject to "requirements, terms, 
and conditions," (§54-8b-3 (2)) is clearly indicative of a legis-
lative intent that the statute be a flexible tool for the Commis-
sion to use. 
Section 54-8b-3(2) sets forth four findings that the 
Commission must make to support an exemption from regulation for 
a service: 
1. The service is subject to effective competition; 
2. Customers of the service have reasonably available 
alternatives; 
3. The service does not serve a captive customer base; and 
4. Exemption is in the public interest. 
000520 
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Each criterion has words that are not otherwise defined. For 
example: What is "effective" competition? What is a "reasonably 
available alternative"? What is a "captive customer base"? What 
is the definition of the public interest? The Commission has 
obviously been granted substantial discretion to define these 
terms in the context of a particular set of facts. We do not 
intend to attempt to define these terms in the abstract — by 
their nature they cannot be so defined in the absence of specific 
facts to test them against. 
In addition to the four criteria, Section 54-8b-3(2) 
contains additional matters for the Commission's consideration. 
The relevant portion states: 
In determining whether to exempt any 
telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service from any require-
ment of this title, the commission shall 
consider all relevant factors including, but 
not limited to: (a) the number of other 
providers offering similar services; (b) the 
intrastate market power and market share 
within the state of Utah of the telecommu-
nications corporation requesting an ex-
emption; (c) the intrastate market power and 
market share of other providers; (d) the 
existence of other providers to make func-
tionally equivalent services readily avail-
able at competitive rates, terms, and con-
ditions; (e) the effect of exemption on the 
regulated revenue requirements of the tele-
communications corporation requesting an 
exemption; (f) the ease of entry of other 
providers into the marketplace; (g) the 
overall impact of exemption on the public 
interest; (h) the integrity of all service 
providers in the proposed market; (i) the 
cost of providing such service; (j) the 
economic impact on existing telecommunica-
tions corporations; and (k) whether competi-
tion will promote the provision of adequate 
services at just and reasonable rates. 
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(Emphasis added). 
Industrial argued that specific factual evidence must 
be presented as to each of the items set forth above and that the 
Commission has a duty to make explicit factual findings as to 
each. This is an erroneous reading of the statute. The statute 
makes it clear that the Commission may exempt from regulation if 
it "finds" that the four essential criteria are met (i.e. effec-
tive competition, reasonably available alternatives, no captive 
customer base, exemption is in the public interest). These are 
the only four issues upon which the Commission must make explicit 
findings. The additional factors to be considered are not 
separate and apart from the four essential criteria. Indeed, it 
is obvious that they are included in the statute as factors that 
the Commission is to bear in mind in making its findings and 
conclusions as to the four essential criteria. If the position 
advanced by Industrial were correct, then the four essential 
criteria would be rendered essentially superfluous. By expressly 
requiring findings as to the four, but merely indicating that the 
others shall be considered, the Legislature is indicating its 
intent that the latter are to serve as a general guide of rele-
vant questions to examine but is not necessarily indicating that 
all of the criteria are necessarily relevant in a given case. 
Indeed, the statute indicates that other criteria in a given case 
may be relevant. One thing is completely clear: the Legisla-
ture is not requiring separate findings as to each of the fac-
tors. 
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Furthermore, examination of the additional factors 
demonstrates that it would be virtually impossible to reduce some 
of them to factual testimony or to precise factual conclusions. 
Many of them are obviously general policy consideration that 
cannot be expressed in precise factual terms. Thus, while the 
Commission needs to bear these factors in mind, there is no legal 
requirement to make explicit factual findings as to each. 
Industrial and Daniels claim that Mountain Bell failed 
to meet its burden of proof for exemption under the statute. The 
position of Industrial and Daniels in opposition to detariffing 
of rates is based on a reading of Section 54-8b-3 that is much 
too restrictive, both in terms of the letter and spirit of the 
law. The only facts Industrial and Daniels apparently believe 
should be considered in determining whether to grant an exemption 
from regulation are those presented by Mountain Bell. Even if 
this were not a generic proceeding, we would disagree with this 
argument. Proceedings under the statute may be commenced by the 
Commission, the Division, a telephone corporation or a consumer. 
No matter how the proceedings are commenced, it is the duty of 
the Commission to become fully advised so that it may act in the 
public interest. Therefore, we do not regard proceedings under 
the statute as placing a burden on any particular party. This is 
even more the case where, as here, we are engaging in a generic 
proceeding regarding the possible partial deregulation of all 
providers of the service. Our findings and conclusions may be 
based in the totality of the evidence presented to the Commission 
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by all parties, including that presented by the Division, Indus-
trial and Daniels. 
Industrial and Daniels attacked at some lengths the 
exhibits presented by Mr. Murphy to demonstrate the competitive-
ness of the marketplace. Mr. Murphy made it clear that much of 
the information in his exhibits was based on published sources 
which he, as an experienced manager in the mobile radio market-
place, believed were reliable. He acknowledged that he did not 
have personal knowledge concerning some of the information. 
Industrial and Daniels introduced evidence that certain of the 
numbers in the ' exhibit were incorrect. While this evidence 
demonstrated inaccuracies in Mr. Murphy's exhibits, it corrob-
orated the intent and thrust of such exhibits. In its totality, 
the evidence in this matter shows that effective competition for 
mobile service does exist in the seven areas set forth above. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mobile radio service is a two-way communications 
service furnished through a base station between a wireline 
telephone and a mobile unit or between two mobile units. 
2. Several types of entities offer functionally 
equivalent types of mobile radio service. These include Radio 
Communication Carriers (RCCs) such as Daniels and Industrial, 
Wireline Communications Carriers (WCCs) such as Mountain Bell and 
Continental Telephone, Specialized Mobile Radio (SMK) providers, 
Cellular Carriers such as NewVector and Salt Lake City Cellular, 
as well as owners of private systems. We note that intrastate 
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cellular telephone service, at least in the Salt Lake SMSA, will 
be free of all regulatory restraints as of September of this year 
pursuant to Section 54-2-30, Utah Code. 
3. In the Salt Lake City area, functionally equivalent 
mobile radio service is offered by Mountain Bell, Industial, 
Daniels, some SMR providers, NewVector, and Salt Lake City 
Cellular* In Salt Lake City, Mountain Bell has six radio chan-
nels, Industrial has eleven and Daniels has ten. While there is 
not an exact correlation between radio channels and market share, 
there is a general relationship; the more radio channels, the 
more traffic that can be served. 1 On a total state basis, 
Industrial has 581 mobile customers, Daniels has 234 and Mountain 
Bell has 393; the record also shows that on a total state basis, 
Industrial has 18 channels, Daniels has 23 and Mountain Bell has 
16. Industrial testified that Mountain Bell's share of the Salt 
Lake City area market was 30 to 40 percent. In addition, the 
evidence demonstrated that SMRs have the capability of offering 
services equivalent to the mobile services offered by Mountain 
Bell, Daniels, and Industrial and that SMRs are operating in the 
Salt Lake City area. The record also shows that Cellular carri-
ers in the Salt Lake City are are in operation and that they are 
serving numerous customers, 
4. The facts demonstrate that in the Salt Lake City 
area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
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b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base* 
5. In the Ogden area, functionally equivalent mobile 
radio service is offered to the public by Mountain Bell# Daniels, 
Industrial, NewVector, Salt Lake City Cellular and at least one 
SMR. While neither Daniels nor Industrial has radio channels in 
Ogden, their radio systems provide mobile service in the Ogden 
area through their transmitters located in the Oguirrh Mountains. 
Both Industrial and Daniels are certificated to serve the Ogden 
area and both hold themselves out through advertisements as 
providing mobile service in the Ogden area. Through their 
tariffs, both Industrial and Daniels are obligated to provide 
service to customers requesting such service in the Ogden area. 
6. The facts demonstrate that in the Ogden area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
7. In the Provo area, functionally equivalent mobile 
radio service is offered to the public by Mountain Bell, Daniels, 
Industrial, and at least one SMR. While neither Daniels nor 
Industrial has radio channels in Provo, their radio systems 
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provide mobile service in the Provo area through their transmit-
ters located in the Oquirrh Mountains. Both Industrial and 
Daniels are certificated to serve the Provo area and both hold 
themselves out through advertisements as providing mobile service 
in the Provo area. Through their tariffs, both Industrial and 
Daniels are obligated to provide service to customers requesting 
such service in the Provo area. We are also aware that cellular 
service will also be offered in Provo in the future. 
8. The facts demonstrate that in the Provo area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
9. In the Vernal area, functionally equivalent mobile 
radio service is offered to the public by Mountain Bell, Indus-
trial as well as two SMR providers. In Vernal, Mountain Bell has 
four radio channels and Industrial has seven. The testimony 
indicated that the market in Vernal was split fairly evenly 
between Industrial and Mountain Bell. 
10. The facts demonstrate that in the Vernal area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
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c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
11. In the Price area, functionally equivalent mobile 
radio service is offered by Mountain Bell and by Royce's Elec-
tronics. Royce's Electronics is a certificated mobile carrier in 
the Price area and holds itself out as providing such services in 
that area. 
12. The facts demonstrate that in the Price area: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
13. In the Moab and Monticello areas, functionally 
equivalent mobile radio service is offered by Continental Tele-
phone and Royce's Electronics. Both are certificated mobile 
carriers who hold themselves out as providing such services in 
those areas. 
14. The facts demonstrate that in the Moab and 
Monticello areas: 
a. Mobile radio services are subject to effective 
competition. 
b. Customers desiring such services have reasonable 
alternatives that are readily available to them. 
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c. No provider of such service serves a captive 
customer base. 
15. As to all of the areas above listed, we find that 
exempting mobile radio service from the requirements of filing 
and gaining prior approval of rate levels is in the public 
interest. In so concluding we note that the facts in the record 
demonstrate that: 
a. In each of these market areas, there are at least 
two separate entities offering similar services. 
b. In each of these areas, customers and potential 
customers can choose between one or more providers. 
Even though in the Ogden and Provo areas Industrial and 
Mobile claim they have no customers, they also acknowl-
edged that they have not attempted to actively market 
in those areas. Nevertheless, they do serve those areas 
and are obligated to serve. In Ogden, cellular service 
is provided by NewVector and Salt Lake City Cellular. 
Cellular licenses have been granted in the Provo area 
to two companies. There is no evidence that Mountain 
Bell has the kind of market power that would allow it 
to dictate whatever price it chooses. In all the other 
areas, it was clear that no one entity dominated either 
market share or has market power. Just examining the 
number of mobile customers served by each provider 
makes it clear that no one entity has either a dominant 
market share or market power. Mountain Bell, the 
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applicant in this matter, has fewer mobile customers 
than Industrial. Mountain Bell has fewer radio chan-
nels than either Daniels or Industrial. 
c. SMB. providers, RCCs, WCCs, Cellular providers and 
private systems all provide mobile radio services that 
are functionally equivalent — all provide intercon-
nection to the public switched network for mobile 
customers. While the rate structures of the various 
players in each market vary somewhat, they are general-
ly offered at competitive rates, terms and conditions. 
d. Detariffing of rate levels will not adversely 
affect the regulated revenue requirements of Mountain 
Bell. Indeed, the purpose of exemption is to allow it 
the opportunity to remain viable in the marketplace. 
e. There are no legal barriers of entry to become a 
provider of mobile services. SMR providers may enter 
the market without legal restriction. Although the 
matter is currently on appeal, the FCC recently issued 
an order in Docket No. 85-89 reempting state regulation 
of entry into the mobile radio marketplace. Further-
more, we find no prohibitive financial burden to enter 
the market. The recent entry of new providers of such 
service demonstrates the ease of market entry. 
f. The mobile radio service market is an expanding 
one. Virtually all providers are expanding their 
number of available channels. The facts indicate that 
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the current providers of such services are financially 
sound. 
g. As part of our regulatory oversight, we must assure 
that the mobile service of Mountain Bell or other 
carriers is not subsidized by other regulated services. 
Mountain Bell has committed to provide its mobile 
services above its direct costs. As part of our 
regulatory oversight role in the ratemaking process for 
Mountain Bell's regulated services, we will, in future 
ratemaking proceedings, assure ourselves that these 
commitments are met. While cost may be a relevant 
factor in our ongoing oversight role, we do not believe 
it is necessary or relevant that we review specific 
cost data to determine whether exemption should be 
allowed, since, as Dr. Compton correctly points out, if 
it can be shown that a market is competitive "a regu-
latory decision to grant pricing flexibility requires 
no specific knowledge about the providers' costs." 
h. While it is impossible to predict the effect 
exemption will have on existing suppliers, it is 
reasonable to believe that detariffing will result in 
declining prices. How this will affect other suppliers 
will depend on how each responds in the competitive 
marketplace. We have no reason to believe that detar-
iffing will result in any provider gaining dominance in 
the market. Dr. Compton testified that in his opinion 
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Mountain Bell will have no incentive to engage in 
anticompetitive pricing because of the Commission's 
continuing regulatory oversight of its costs and 
revenues in connection with ratemaking and because of 
potential liability under the federal antitrust laws, 
i. Detariffing will provide positive benefits to 
customers. By explicitly allowing price competition in 
the areas set forth above, we believe the result will 
be better service at competitive rates. To the extent 
detariffing results in adverse public impacts, we will 
not hesitate to consider re-regulation. 
16. Based on all the facts in the record, the Commis-
sion concludes that detariffing of mobile rates in the seven 
areas will promote competitive pricing conditions that are just 
and reasonable. Detariffing is therefore in the public interest. 
17. Rural radio service is utilized to provide the 
final link of a customer's service by radio link rather than 
through wire. 
18. Rural radio service, while provided via radio, is 
more closely akin to basic exchange service than to mobile 
service. We are not convinced on the basis of this record that 
there is sufficient competition for the provision of such service 
and therefore decline to detariff rates for the service at this 
time. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Our conclusions regarding SS 54-8b-l et seg. 
contained in the General Discussion section of this Report and 
Order are hereby incorporated herein by reference. 
2. The Commission concludes that as to Moab, 
Monticello, Ogden, Salt Lake Cityf Provo, Price, Vernal and their 
surrounding areas, there is effective competition for the pro-
vision of mobile telephone service, that customers have rea-
sonably available alternatives, that suppliers do not service 
captive customer bases and that detariffing of rates is in the 
public interest. 
3. As to rural radio services, the Commission con-
cludes that the service does not meet the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. §54-8b-3(2). 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That: 
1# Effective immediately, regulated suppliers of 
mobile telephone service in the following cities and surrounding 
areas, may remove rate levels from their tariffs: 
Moab Monticello 
Ogden Salt Lake City 
Provo Price 
Vernal 
Such suppliers need not seek prior approval of changes in rates 
for mobile telephone service. 
2. Rate levels for rural radio service shall continue 
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to be tariffed and subject to all regulatory requirements of 
Title 54. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of April, 
1987. 
/s/ Brian T« Stewart, Chairman 
(SEAL) I si Brent H. Cameron Commissioner 
I si James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Stephen C. Hewlett, Secretary 
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
In the Matter of the Petition 
Of THE MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY for Exemption from 
Regulation of Mobile Radio 
Service and Rural Radio Service 
Case Nos. 85-049-09; 
85-999-19 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
AND REHEARING 
* * * * * * * * 
David R. Williams, dba Industrial Communications 
("Industrial"), intervenor and protestant in the above-entitled 
matter respectfully petitions the Commission to review, rehear, 
and upon review and rehearing, to reverse the Report and Order 
issued in the above-entitled matter dated April 17, 1987. 
Petitioner asserts that this Petition should be granted because 
the Report and Order is erroneous as a matter of law for the 
following reasons: 
1. The Commission misinterpreted and misapplied the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated S 54-8(b)-3. 
2. The Commission erred at hearing by receiving in 
evidence written testimony, oral testimony and exhibits sponsored 
by James H. Murphy, by refusing to strike the same and by basing 
findings of fact thereon. 
00053*7 
3. Findings of Fact set forth in the Report and Order 
numbered 2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,14,15 and 16 are not supported by the 
record and are erroneous as a matter of law. 
4. Conclusions stated by the Commission in the 
section of the Report and Order titled "General Discussion" 
together with Conclusions of Law numbered 1 and 2 are erroneous 
as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
I. THE COMMISSION MISINTERPRETED AND 
MISAPPLIED THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED S 54-8(b)-3 
Utah Code Annotated S 54-8(b)-3 provides in the first 
full paragraph of subsection (2) that an order issued by the 
Commission under the power vested by the statute must be 
supported by four specifically designated findings of fact. 
After so providing, subsection (2) then states that in making 
those findings the Commission must consider all relevant factors. 
"Relevant factors" are defined in that paragraph to include, but 
not to be limited to, specifically designed factors, some of 
which were ignored completely by the Commission in this 
proceeding because no evidence was produced regarding the same by 
the Commission itself or any party to the proceeding. That 
paragraph reads as follows: 
In determining whether to exempt any tele-
communications corporation or public tele-
communications service from any requirement 
of this title, the commission shall consider 
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all relevant factors including, but not 
limited to: (a) the number of other 
providers offering similar services; (b) the 
intrastate market power and market share 
within the state of Utah of the tele-
communications corporation requesting an 
exemption; (c) the intrastate market power 
and market share of other providers; (d) the 
existence of other providers to make functio-
nally equivalent services readily available 
at competitive rates, terms, and conditions; 
(e) the effect of exemption on the regulated 
revenue requirements of the telecommun-
ications corporation requesting an exemption; 
(f) the ease of entry of other providers into 
the marketplace; (g) the overall impact of 
exemption on the public interest; (h) the 
integrity of all service providers in the 
proposed market; (i) the cost of providing 
such service; (j) the economic impact on 
existing telecommunications corporation; and 
(k) whether competition will promote the 
provision of adequate services at just and 
reasonable rates. (Emphasis added). 
At pp. 8 and 9 of the Report and Order the Commission 
badly misconstrues the interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 
S 54-8(b)-3 which was urged by Williams at the hearing. The 
position of Williams was and is that the four findings designated 
in the first full paragraph of subsection (2) of this statute are 
mandatory; that no specific findings need be made with regard to 
defined "relevant factors" numbered (a) through (k); but that 
the Commission must consider each of those enumerated factors in 
making the required findings of fact. The statute specifically 
so states. It follows that if neither the Commission nor any 
party to the proceedings offers any evidence whatsoever regarding 
-3-
000539 
one or more of those "relevant factors," and the Commission, 
nonetheless, purports to enter an order pursuant to the authority 
granted by the statute, it will not act in conformance with the 
provisions of the statute. It did not so act here. 
Illustrative of the Commission's error is "relevant 
factor" (i) "the cost of providing such service." That factor, 
in addition to being defined by the statute as a required 
"relevant factor", is of particular importance here because the 
applicant (Mtn. Bell) seeks to remove from regulation by the 
Commission its pricing of this service. The operating witness 
which it sponsored at the hearing admitted that Mtn. Bell had 
available cost studies and could have produced and presented 
evidence of its cost of service but refrained from doing so and 
refused to answer questions on this subject. (TR. 41, 97-8) 
Instead of requiring evidence of applicant's "cost of 
services" so that this "relevant factor" could be considered in 
making its necessary findings of fact, the Commission determined 
that this particular factor was not "relevant" in this case. At 
page 17 of the Report and Order the Commission stated that in 
this case cost is neither "necessary" nor "relevant". In so 
holding, the Commission relied upon the testimony of Dr. Compton 
who stated that "a regulatory decision to grant pricing 
flexibility requires no specific knowledge about the provider's 
cost." With all due respect to Dr. Compton's opinion, and 
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without arguing whether or not his opinion has any merit, suffice 
it to say that both he and the Commission have substituted their 
wisdom for that of the Utah Legislature. The Legislature has 
mandated a consideration of this factor. 
The Commission likewise, and we assume for similar 
reasons, failed to give due consideration to "relevant factors" 
numbered (b),(c),(d),(e),(g),(j) and (k). These errors require 
review, rehearing and reversal. 
II. THE COMMISSION ERRED AT HEARING BY RECEIVING 
IN EVIDENCE WRITTEN TESTIMONY, ORAL TESTIMONY 
AND EXHIBITS SPONSORED BY JAMES H. MURPHY, BY 
REFUSING TO STRIKE THE SAME AND BY BASING 
FINDS OF FACT THEREON 
The applicant at hearing sponsored written testimony, 
oral testimony and exhibits through its operating witness James 
H. Murphy. To the extent that such "evidence" is material to any 
of the issues in this proceeding, it is almost wholly comprised 
of inadmissible speculation and conclusions without any 
foundation whatsoever or based upon various types of hearsay. 
The Commission overruled appropriate objections to this testimony 
and denied motions to strike the same. (TR. 21,58,61-3,94,117) 
Nonetheless, it premised critical and necessary findings thereon. 
Commissioner Cameron stated as follows with respect to 
the "hearsay" aspect of Mr. Murphy's testimony: (TR. 29-30) 
"Hearsay evidence is admissible in Utah in administrative 
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hearings. It cannot be relied on solely for a finding of fact or 
conclusion by the Commission11. 
We do not argue with this statement. However, Mr. 
Murphy's "hearsay" is "solely" the basis of some of the 
Commission's findings and conclusions. And, even more 
troublesome, some of the Commission's findings and conclusions 
are based upon Murphy's pure speculations and conclusions which 
were, admittedly, lacking in any foundation whatsoever. They 
were not even supported by "hearsay" material but were plucked 
from the air. By way of example, but not of limitation, Mr. 
Murphy speculated and concluded that SMRs provided functionally 
equivalent mobile telephone service to that offered by the 
applicant and by Williams. This factual information is critical 
because the legislature in its wisdom has mandated that the 
commission "shall" consider, among other things, before issuing 
an order under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated S 54-8(b)-l, 
as one of the "relevant factors" the "existence of other 
providers to make functionally equivalent services readily 
available at competitive rates, terms and conditions" (emphasis 
added). 
Despite the fact that Mr. Murphy conceded on cross 
examination that he was not familiar with a single SMR in Utah or 
the services which it provided (TR. 32), the Commission 
erroneously accepted and relied upon his conclusions as to 
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functional equivalency of services. If the Commission is at 
liberty to premise findings of fact upon such completely 
unfounded speculation it may as well dispense with hearings 
altogether because they become absolutely meaningless. 
We respectfully submit that the commission erred as a 
matter of law by receiving such speculation in the first place, 
by refusing to strike the same from the record and then by 
relying upon the same to underpin critical fact considerations 
and findings required by the legislature. 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT SET FORTH IN THE REPORT 
AND ORDER NUMBERED 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 14, 15 AND 16 ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE RECORD AND ARE ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER 
OF LAW 
In making its "Findings of Fact", the Commission went 
beyond the statutory mandated four specific findings. However, 
it is important to review those findings which it did make 
because they obviously underpin the ultimate conclusions reached 
by the Commission in its Report and Order. 
1. We first invite the attention of the Commission to 
Finding of Fact number 2 at pages ten and eleven. The first 
sentence of that Finding reads "several types of entities offer 
functionally equivalent types of mobile radio service", 
(emphasis added). A central underpending finding of this 
paragraph is that "specialized mobile radio (SMR) providers" 
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offer a "functionally equivalent" service. Functionally 
equivalent service as specifically defined by statute. In the 
second full paragraph of Utah Code Annotated S 54-8(b)-3 (2) this 
term is defined as a service which is at "functionally 
equivalent" and "readily available at competitive ratesr terms, 
and conditions," It is respectfully submitted that the only 
"evidence" upon which this "Finding of Fact" could be premised is 
the diseased testimony of Mr. Murphy which is addressed above and 
which could not possible underpin such a finding. Murphy 
admittedly had ITO knowledge or information relating to either the 
identity of or the services offered by any SMR offering a service 
in Utah! The findings as to each of the designated areas that 
SMRs offer a "functionally equivalent service" are erroneous on 
their face. The record is absolutely barren of any evidence upon 
which the necessary further examination could be made to 
ascertain whether or not such services were "readily available at 
competitive rates, terms and conditions." Indeed, there is no 
evidence on this record relating to their rates and the 
uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that their terms and 
conditions of service are completely different. In fact, none of 
those SMRs is even regulated by this Commission. 
Dr. Compton addressed this subject in his testimony. 
He stated (controverted only by Murphy's bootstrapped and 
unsupported speculations) that "SMRs may or may not be effective 
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competition depending upon how open they are". (TR. 169) Mr. 
Burnett, counsel who sponsored Division witnesses Capshaw and 
Compton admitted, in response to specific inquiry by Commissioner 
Cameron as to whether or not SMRs are "effective competition" 
stated: (TR. 170) 
MR. BURNETT: Well, I think what Mr. Capshaw said is 
you need to make an evaluation of that but absent that evaluation 
which we didn't feel like we had in this proceeding, particularly 
for each individual town or municipality or area, we did know as 
a matter of record or as a matter of personal knowledge that we 
had more than one regulated carrier in each of these towns, but 
if you were going to make an analysis in other towns where 
perhaps you had a — some competition between SMR's or 
competition between an SMR and an RCC that evaluation hasn't been, 
made. 
COM. CAMERON: So the Division is not making a 
recommendaiton — 
MR. BURNETT: — that we should include SMR's as 
competition; is that — 
MR. BURNETT: Well, I think that would require a 
further proceeding. 
2. Similarly, the statement in Finding of Fact number 
3, that SMR providers in Salt Lake City offer "functionally 
equivalent" mobile services is erroneous as a matter of law. The 
additional critical finding made here by the Commission that "New 
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Vector" and "Salt Lake City Cellular" also offer a "functionally 
equivalent" service is without support in the evidence. 
Admittedly, Salt Lake City Cellular had not even entered the 
market and offered no services at all at the date of the hearing. 
(TR 60) Under the applicable statute, to be "functionally 
equivalent", the service must "readily available at competitive 
rates, terms and conditions". Under this test, the kind of 
service offered to the public by New Vector is not "functionally 
equivalent" because costs are from 600 to 700 percent more than 
for IMTS service now offered by the regulated carriers. This 
type of service has some advantages and some disadvantages to the 
presently available regulated service, but certainly is not 
"functionally equivalent". (TR. 246) 
3. Findings in Finding of Fact number 5 at page 12 
that SMRs, New Vector and Salt Lake Cellular offer "functionally 
equivalent mobile radio service" is similarly erroneous. 
4. Each of the specific Findings of Fact contained in 
paragraph 6 at page 12 is similarly erroneous, not supported by 
evidence, and contrary to the uncontroverted evidence. As a 
matter of fact, Mtn. Bell has 100% of the Ogden market. It has a 
captive customer base. Customers have no competitive alternative 
available for them whatsoever. Although, Industrial has 
authority from this Commission to service the area, it cannot do 
so competitively because customers in Ogden desiring to call 
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mobile units in Ogden have to pay a long distance charge when 
dealing with industrial which is not true with Mtn. Bell. This 
explains why Mtn* Bell has 100% of the market. No other service 
is competitive at all (TR. 241). 
5. Findings of Fact number 7 at pages 12-13 is 
similarly erroneous. In the Provo area, Mtn. Bell has 100% of 
the market because none of the regulated carriers can offer a 
complete service without imposing a long distance charge. Mtn. 
Bell services a captive customer base where no reasonable 
alternative service is available to them which is "readily 
available at competitive rates, terms and conditions". (TR. 
235r 238) 
6. The Findings of Fact contained in paragraph 8 at 
page 13 similarly are totally erroneous regarding service 
available in the Provo area. 
7. The Findings of Fact contained in paragraph 9 at 
pages 13 and 14 are erroneous in that they find that SMRs in the 
Vernal area offer a "functionally equivalent" service and that 
mobile radio services are subject to effective competition in 
that area. Industrial is the only arguable competitor of Mtn. 
Bell in the Vernal area. However, it is uncontroverted that Mtn. 
Bell has a distinct and unfair competitive advantage in Vernal 
because all of its services are automated and the industrial 
4 
competitive service is manual. Industrial could convert its 
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service to a competitive automated service, but only with the 
cooperation with Mtn. Bellf which to the date of hearing it has 
refused to give. (TR. 291-3) 
8. Similarly, the Findings of Fact set forth in 
paragraph 10 at pages 13 and 14 are wholly unsupported by 
evidence and contrary to the uncontroverted evidence with respect 
to services available in the Vernal area. 
9. Similarly, the Findings of Fact set forth in 
paragraph 14 at pages 14 and 15 are not supported by evidence and 
are contrary to uncontroverted evidence of record. 
10. Findings of Fact number 15 at pages 15-18 contain 
numerous erroneous findings which duplicate those already 
addressed above. By way of illustration, but not of exclusion, 
we invite the attention to the Commission of specific findings 
set forth in this paragraph, not heretofore addressed, and which 
are wholly erroneous on this record on a matter of laws 
(a) Statement at page 15 that "there is no evidence 
that Mountain Bell has the kind of market power that would allow 
it to dictate whatever price it chooses1'. This wholly erroneous 
finding is of specific importance because the second full 
paragraph of subsection (2) of Utah Code Annotated § 54-8(b)-3 
mandates the consideration of these very factors. Applicants own 
operating witness admitted that "the resources are there" and the 
"ability is there" for Mtn. Bell to dictate whatever price it 
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chooses and to drive the competition right out of business. In 
addition, Mr. Kapshaw conceded on cross examination that Mtn. 
Bell and Cellular, (a sister company) could have the staying 
power to set rates where they could get rid of both Mobile and 
Industrial and have the entire market to themselves. (TR. 148) 
(b) Statements contained in the last two full 
sentences at page 15 to the effect that no one entity dominated 
market share or has market power demonstrated by the number of 
customers served by each provider. These statements generalize 
Mobile Radio Service throughout the state of Utah. This simply 
cannot be done because of the local nature of the markets 
(TR. 249). This statement is not supported by any evidence 
whatsoever with respect to many of the service areas in the state 
of Utah where a single provider of service is available (see 
e.g. , Wendover, Utah where Mtn. Bell is the only supplier) 
(TR. 43). (See also the Ogden and Provo areas where Mtn. Bell has 
100 percent of the market.) 
(c) At page 16 the Commission states that the FCC in 
Docket No. 8589 preempts state regulation. In point of fact, 
that ruling has been reversed by the federal court. 
(d) At page 16 in the last full paragraph of paragraph 
designated e., the Commission states there is no prohibitive 
financial burden to enter the market. This statement is 
unsupported by evidence of record and is contrary to 
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uncontroverted evidence of record. For example, Mr. Capshaw 
testified that it would cost tens of thousands of dollars to 
enter the market in the local rural areas and that, in his 
opinion, there will never be competition in small towns because 
of the small volume of customers and the difficulty with terrain 
(TR. 142, 152). Dr. Compton testified that it would cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to enter the market place in 
Salt Lake City (TR. 222). 
11. Finding of Fact number 16 at page 18 is in fact a 
Conclusion of Law. As such it is erroneous as a matter of law. 
IV. THE CONCLUSIONS STATED BY THE 
COMMISSION IN THE SECTION OF THE REPORT 
AND ORDER TITLED "GENERAL DISCUSSION" 
TOGETHER WITH CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 
AND 2 ARE ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
These conclusions of law, coupled with those stated in 
Findings of Fact number 16 at page 18, are erroneous as a matter 
of law because of the erroneous fact findings that underpin them 
and because of the misconstruction and misapplication of the 
applicable statute by the Commission discussed above. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Commission should 
review the report and order in this matter and grant a rehearing 
therein. Following review and rehearing, the order should be set 
aside in its entirety and the application of Mtn. Bell for 
relief, together with the related generic proceeding, should be 
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dismissed. As noted above, the Commission has failed to give 
consideration to factors mandated for consideration by the 
Legislature. It has not produced evidence itself, nor has it 
required other parties of record to produce evidence, regarding 
factors which must be reviewed to underpin an affirmative order 
under the applicable statute. The Commission has made specific 
findings of fact which underpin its Report and Order which are 
completely unsupported by evidence and which are contrary to 
uncontroverted evidence of record. 
It follows that the report and order on file herein 
should be reviewed and withdrawn. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S& day of May, 1987. 
KEI*H>E. TA^ LOtf 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for David R. Williams 
dba Industrial Communications 
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Jon C. Heaton 
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250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
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Brian W. Burnett, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
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APPENDIX "C" 
54-8B-3. Commission jurisdiction over tele-
communications - Exemptions from title 
allowed - Hearings and findings - Approval 
period. 
(1) The commission is vested with power and 
jurisdiction to partially or wholly exempt 
from any requirement of this title any tele-
communications corporation or public telecom-
munications service in this state. 
(2) The commission, on its own initiative or 
in response to an application by a telecommu-
nications corporation or a user of a public 
telecommunications service, may, after public 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, make 
findings and issue an order specifying its 
requirements, terms, and conditions exempting 
any telecommunications corporation or any 
public telecommunications service from any 
requirement of this title either for a spe-
cific geographic area or in the entire state 
if the commission finds that the telecommuni-
cations corporation or service is subject to 
effective competition, that customers of the 
telecommunications corporation or service 
have reasonably available alternatives, and 
that the telecommunications corporation or 
service does not serve a captive customer 
base, and if such exemption is in the public 
interest of the citizens of the state. In 
determining whether to exempt any telecommu-
nications corporation or public telecommuni-
cations service from any requirement of this 
title, the commission shall consider all rel-
evant factors including, but not limited to: 
(a) the number of other providers offering 
similar services; (b) the intrastate market 
power and market share within the state of 
Utah of the telecommunications corporation 
requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate 
market power and market share of other pro-
viders; (d) the existence of other providers 
to make functionally equivalent services 
readily available at competitive rates, 
-27-
termsf and conditions; (e) the effect of 
exemption on the regulated revenue require-
ments of the telecommunications corporation 
requesting an exemption; (f) the ease of 
entry of other providers into the market-
place; (g) the overall impact of exemption on 
the public interest; (h) the integrity of all 
service providers in the proposed market; 
(i) the cost of providing such service; 
(j) the economic impact on existing telecom-
munications corporations; and (k) whether 
competition will promote the provision of 
adequate services at just and reasonable 
rates. 
(3) The commission shall approve or deny any 
application for exemption under this section 
within 240 days, except that the commission 
may by order defer action for an additional 
30-day period. If the commission has not 
acted on any application within the permitted 
time period, the application shall be deemed 
granted. 
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